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OBSTACLES TO A WORLD LEGAL ORDER AND
THEIR REMOVAL*
T HE present need for a world legal order is obvious. In an atomic
age the settlement of international disputes by resort to force
rather than by recourse to law is so likely, if not absolutely certain,
to mean the end of civilization that it involves a risk which no wise
man, if he can avoid it, will take.
One may well ask why in the face of this fact, evident to all, recent
attempts at a legal world order have failed to achieve their goal. Cer-
tainly the time has come when the cause of this failure must be de-
termined and if possible removed.
A clue to the cause of failure may be found by determining what
prerequisite is present in those cases in which the settling of disputes
by recourse to legal institutions is effective. This prerequisite has been
indicated in Ehrlich's Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law." In this great work, Ehrlich draws the very important distinc-
tion between what he terms the "positive law" and the "living law."
The positive law is the law appearing as propositions in constitu-
tions and legal statutes. It is also embodied in the legal institutions
for formulating, applying and enforcing these propositions. The
living law, on the other hand, is the de facto behavior and normative
practices and beliefs of the majority of the people in the community
quite apart from the positive law. It is one of Ehrlich's great achieve-
ments to have shown that positive law is never effective by means
other than those of force imposed by a dictator or absolute military
monarch,2 unless the positive law corresponds to the living law.
* The author is gratefully indebted to the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthro-
pological Research for a grant which makes possible this and other research in the
philosophy of cultural and legal norms.
iHarvard University Press, 1936.
2 Ehrlich even questioned the validity of this qualification. All that is necesary for
the purpose of this inquiry is his rule in his qualified, rather than in his unqualified,
formulation of it.
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One can have a positive law unsustained by the living law of a
minority of the community providing that the positive law does cor-
respond to and is sustained by the living law of a majority in that
community. The majority will then give the moral support to legally
constituted political offcials and the police enabling them to enforce
the positive legal norms on the minority of individuals whose be-
havior and normative beliefs otherwise would not conform to those
norms. But one cannot, in any society in which force under dictator-
ship is not the means of settling disputes, have an effective positive
law corresponding only to the living law of a minority of the com-
munity.
The recent experience of the United States with respect to the Pro-
hibition Amendment is a case in point. During the First World War
a well-intentioned minority succeeded in establishing the prohibition
norm as positive Federal Law. It soon became evident, however, that
this positive legal norm did not correspond to the spontaneously
accepted moral and social norms of either a majority of the people
or of many moral, social and religious leaders whose intellectual and
moral integrity could not be questioned. Thus the Prohibition law
failed because it was a positive law which did not correspond to the
living law of either many moral leaders or the majority of the people
generally in the community.
The recent introduction of Western law into China is another case
in point. The results show concretely in the experiences of Professor
Francis S. Liu as reported by him in his lectures on Chinese law in
the Yale Law School during the academic year 1947-1948. Professor
Liu in the early part of his career took, in his own country, the regu-
lar pre-revolutionary Chinese examinations for membership in the
Chinese legal profession. Following this he came to the Western
world where he took a degree in Western law in the United States
and studied in Germany under the great Western legal thinker,
Stammler. While pursuing these studies, his country formed its Na-
tional Government and established a legal constitution built upon
the Western legal model. It was natural, therefore, when Dr. Liu
returned to China and to its most westernized city, Shanghai, that
he should proceed to practice in the Western manner, handling his
clients' disputes according to the norms and methods of the Western
type of law of the National Government of China which was then in
power. He found, however, when he did this that he lost his clients.
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He found furthermore that he won his clients back when he pro-
ceeded to practice law according to the traditional moral and legal
norms of Chinese Confucian philosophy. The fact was that the new
Westernized positive law of recent National China was not sustained
by the living law.
Once these considerations are noted, the cause of the present fail-
ure to achieve a world legal order, notwithstanding the suicidal
nature of war in an atomic age, becomes evident. Proponents of
world government have been acting on the erroneous assumption that
all that is necessary to achieve a legal world order is to have lawyers
write out a world constitution defining such an order and then to
propagandize for the popular acceptance of this constitution. In
short it has been assumed that all that is needed is the positive law,
completely overlooking the fact that positive law is useless if it is not
sustained by the living law.
Once this cause of the failure of previous attempts to obtain a
world legal order becomes evident, the cure for this failure becomes
equally evident. We must direct attention temporarily away from the
positive law to the living law. More specifically we must determine
the living law norms of the major peoples and cultures of the world.
For unless the positive law norms and institutions of the world legal
order have roots in, correspond to, and are sustained by the de facto
cultural living law norms of the majority of people and their ideo-
logical and moral leaders in each of the major nations and cultures
of the world, the positive world constitution and world legal institu-
tions will not have the living law sanctions in the hearts, beliefs, and
social behavior of men, necessary to sustain them; in fact the peoples
of any culture or nation will not commit their values and fate unre-
servedly to the world legal order in the first place.
It becomes dear, therefore, that a world constitution or a world
legal order, which is to be effective, must be rooted in the living
legal and cultural norms of the major peoples and cultures of the
world. This means that we must turn away temporarily from prac-
ticing lawyers, statesmen and practical propagandists for world gov-
ernment, to cultural anthropologists and sociologists, and to students
of the philosophy of the world's cultures for a solution of the prob-
lem. It is cultural anthropology and sociology which make evident to
us the de facto living law, social institutions and behavior of men. But
it is not behavior of any kind as revealed by cultural social science
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which is important. The living law of any culture is defined by the
normative beliefs and behavior of the majority of people in that
culture. Thus cultural anthropology and sociology must be pursued
to the point where the basic concepts defining the living law norms of
that culture and their attendant effective positive laws are discovered.
The basic concepts of any subject are by definition the philosophy
of that subject. Consequently only a cultural anthropology and
sociology which pursues its study of any culture to the point where
the study exhibits the philosophy of that culture is capable of ex-
hibiting its living law.
In this connection recent developments in cultural anthropology
and cultural sociology are very important. It was originally thought
by many social scientists that facts alone, objectively determined by
observing the behavior and institutions of a given people or culture,
were sufficient. This rested on the naive error that it is possible in
science to convey facts without bringing them under concepts. Yet
science which is of any use to men must report the facts which it
finds in scientific journals or describe them verbally at scientific meet-
ings. But facts described verbally in public or by writing in journals
are facts brought under concepts, and when one has concepts one
also has theory. Thus what happened when many social scientists
attempted to be purely inductive and factual was that they did not
watch their concepts, and thus unconsciously and surreptitiously
tended to define a foreign culture in terms of concepts brought to that
culture by modern Western social scientists. The result was not an
objective description of the foreign culture but its facts as seen
through modern Western conceptual eyes.
The longer, however, that Western social scientists stayed with
a given culture, the more it became evident to some of the more
critical and acute of them that they did not understand or cor-
rectly describe the behavior and institutions they observed until they
conceptualized these factual materials in terms of the concepts used
by the people in the culture in question. Since philosophy is but the
name for the basic concepts used by anyone to conceptualize the facts
of his experience, it has happened that recent developments in cul-
tural anthropology and sociology lead straight to the philosophy
of culture. This is the point in the sociologist Pitirim Sorokin's
observation that causality in social phenomena is logical-meaning-
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ful 3 It is the point also in the anthropologist Clyde iud-
hohn's demonstration4 that even a so-called primitive people such as
the Navaho Indians are not understood until their particular philoso-
phy is discovered. Only by specifying the elementary assumptions or
philosophy, in terms of which a given people conceptualize the facts
of their experience and order and evaluate their cultural and legal
institutions and judge those other people, does cultural anthropology
and sociology become truly objective, understanding a given culture
in terms of its concepts rather than one's own.
We possess, therefore, in the methods of contemporary cultural
anthropology and sociology and the philosophy of culture a scientific
and philosophical procedure for determining the living law of any
specific people or culture in the world.' The first step, therefore, on
the way to an effective legal world order is evident.
But once this step is taken the difficulties in the way of reaching
a legal world order become specific and even more evident.
The kind of phenomenon experienced, as indicated above, by Pro-
fessor Liu when he practiced law in Shanghai on the basis of Western
positive legal norms, becomes evident everywhere internationally.
The living law norms of one country or culture are not those of an-
other, and when introduced into that other culture often not only
do not work but, as Professor Liu has written, result in positive
harm. 6
That this is as true of Western Christian religious norms, when
they are introduced into Asia, as it is of Western legal norms is
demonstrated by the objective study over twenty-five years by the
Indian sociologist Professor N. G. D. Joardar of the Indian Christian
community in Lucknow, India.7 His findings are all the more impres-
sive because he is not merely sympathetic to Christianity but a Chris-
tian.
3 Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality, Harper & Bros., New York,
1947, pp. 146, 313-341, 537-554 and 635-658.
4 Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians" in Ideologicd Dif-
ferences and World Order edited by F. S. C. Northrop Yale University Press, 1949.
s F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences an2 the Humanities, Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1947, Chapters XIV, XVI, XMVIII, XX and XXI. "Philosophical Anthro-
pology and World Law," in Transactions of tke New York Academy of Sciences, Ser.
If, Vol. 14, Dec. 1951, No. 2, pp. 109-112.
6 iu Shih-Fang, -Westernized Administration of Justice and Chinese Racial Char-
acteristics." English translation by Alfred Wang. Typevritten copy in the Yale Law
School library.
7 N. G. D. Joardar, The Indian Christians of Lucknow, India. Ph..D. thesis deposited
in the Yale University Library.
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Put in more general terms, studies of the diverse cultures of the
world by cultural anthropologists and sociologists who have stayed
with the people or cultures being observed long enough to find the
basic concepts and attendant norms of the culture under observation,
reveal that different cultures have differing basic concepts and hence
differing philosophies and attendantly different living law norms.
An independent investigation of the philosophical assumptions under-
lying the economic, political and cultural ideologies of the major
nations of the contemporary world confirms this conclusion. 8
There are, to be sure, identities rather than differences, as the
latter study and some social scientists such as Pitirim Sorokin,9 G.
P. Murdock 0 and Clyde Kluckhohn" emphasize. Of the importance
of the identities, more later. Even so an approach to world legal
order which does not face the differences is doomed to failure for, as
present relations between the traditional democracies and Soviet
Russia indicate, the question of whether war or peace ensues is more
likely to turn around a resolution of the differences in their respec-
tive economic, political and religious norms than on the assumptions
which the nations have in common.
At last we find the basic cause of the failure of all attempts to date
to achieve an effective legal world order: The living law norms of
the world differ and in certain cases even conflict, being in fact many
rather than one. In other words the living law of the world supports
and sustains the contemporary legal pluralism of sovereign nations;
it does not provide a single sufficiently determinate legal norm com-
mon to all peoples and cultures such as is required to define and sus-
tain a positive effective legal world order capable of resolving dis-
putes between nations by recourse to legal processes rather than to
force.
We seem to be faced, therefore, with an irresolvable paradox: In
an atomic age there is a living law need for a legal world order. It is
difficult to conceive of anything more required by the living law than
the need for life itself. Ehrlich, however, has made it clear that no
positive legal constitution or political institution will be effective
8 F. S. C. Northrop, The Aeeting of East and West, Macmillan Co., New York,
1946.
9 Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Lasting and Dying Factors in the World's Cultures" In
Ideological Differences and WVorld Order, loc. cit.
10 G. P. Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures" in The Scionce of
Afan and the World Crisis, edited by Ralph Linton, Columbia University Press, 1945.
11 Clyde Kluckhohn, .Mirror for Man, Whittlesey House, 1949, Chapter X.
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unless it is sustained by the living law, and the fact is that the living
law of the world is many rather than one--opposing often rather
than sustaining an effective positive legal world order. In short, while
there is a living law need for an effective positive legal world order,
the content of the living law of the world, without which no positive
legal constitution or institution is effective, is not such as to sustain
such an order.
It is precisely because the latter fact is the case that the competing
unrestricted nationalistic legal sovereignties are here and have the
public support which they enjoy. It would seem, therefore, that the
necessity of having the positive law sustained by the living law ren-
ders all attempts at a legal world order misguided and incapable of
achieving their goal.
This is the real consideration behind the contention of many stu-
dents of international relations who affirm that the only hope for
peace is by a power politics balancing of the nationalistic and
pluralistic legal sovereignties. Any other policy rests on the mis-
guided assumption, they maintain, that positive law can be effective
when the living law is contrary to it, and will as a consequence not-
withstanding its good intentions do more harm than good.
It is to be emphasized, however, that from Ehrlich's thesis that the
positive law must be sustained by the living law and from the fact
that the living law of the world is diverse, often conflicting, and
many rather than one, it does not follow that all attempts at world
government are misguided and incapable of achieving their aim.
What does follow is that the aim can be achieved only by creating a
new universal living norm to correspond to and sustain the posi-
tive law norm of a legal world order.
That living law norms can be transformed, history demonstrates.
The living law of the Romans originally was not even that of a na-
tion; it was first the norm merely of a city and before that merely
the collection of diverse norms of diverse families. The living law
of the present Western nations is not the original living law of either
the Greeks or the Romans or of any other ancient people of the
Western world. Thus, the very existence of the present diverse and
conflicting nationalistic living law norms in the world is itself a
demonstration that living law norms can be transformed. In fact the
Romans went directly from the living law norm, believed to apply
only to the individual family, to a living law norm believed to hold
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for all men the world over; they did not go first from a family living
law to a national living law and then from a national living law to a
living law the norm of which is universal. Thus history shows that
it is possible to transform the living law from pluralism toward uni-
versality.
There are two methods by which this can be done. The one is the
method of the philosophy of the world's cultures. The other is the
method of the philosophy of nature.
The method of the philosophy of the world's cultures proceeds,
building upon cultural anthropology and sociology, to seek out the
present living law philosophical and legal norms of the major cul-
tures and peoples of the world. In many of these there are already
living law norms with content which will sustain a positive universal
legal world order. The wise framers of a world constitution and
world legal institutions will use words and other symbols from the
cultures in question which have roots in and take advantage of these
sustaining living law factors.
Also, as was noted earlier, contemporary cultural social science
and the philosophy of the world's cultures find basic concepts and
norms in common as well as concepts and norms different, or even in
conflict, in the different nations and cultures of the world. A wise
world jurisprudence will frame its doctrine in terms of these common
factors, pushing the differences out of the focus of attention for the
moment, so as to take advantage of the factors present in the living
laws of the world, which are universal and which will sustain a world
common law.12
In this manner a new, truly world jus gentium can be achieved in
part precisely in the manner in which Gaius and his successor, Justin-
ian achieved the partial and, in fact, provincial jus gentium which is
traditional Western law. At the beginning of his Institutes Gaius
writes as follows:
Every human community that is regulated by laws and customs, observes
a rule of conduct which in part is peculiar to itself, and in part is common
to mankind in general. The rule of conduct which a people has settled for
its own observance, and which is peculiar to that people, is termed the jis
civile. Those principles which natural reason has taught to all mankind,
12 See Gray L. Dorsey, "Two Objective Bases for a World-wide Legal Order,"
Ideological Differences and World Order, loc. cit., Chapter XXI; also Pitinm A. Soro-
kin, "Lasting and Dying Factors in the World's Cultures," ibid, Chapter XX.
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are equally observed by all, and collectively are termed the jus genthim.'3
This method of the science and philosophy of the world's cultures
will, however, not be enough. A world law restricted to a jus gentiulm
composed of nothing but the living law norms which Russian Com-
munists, capitalistic democratic, socialist democratic, Chinese Con-
fucian, Hindu Indian and Latin psychological living norms have in
common would be entirely too weak and would lack the contem-
porary technical content from natural science necessary to provide
a criterion for resolving the international disputes of a Twentieth
Century world in which scientific knowledge, sought by Asiatics as
well as Westerners, is so important. Also, as previously noted, the
living law of the world exhibits normative ethical, ideological and
legal differences and even incompatibilities as well as common fac-
tors, with the issue of war and peace between the nations turning
more on the normative differences and conflicts in the world's living
law than on the identities. These considerations make it necessary to
supplement the living law sanctions for a positive legal world order
which are obtainable from cultural anthropology and sociology and
the philosophy of culture with new living law sanctions from some
other source.
The authors of ancient Hindu law suggest their source. Dharma
derives from Rita which has its source in nature.
The framers of Roman law agree. They were Stoic philosophers
who went beneath the conventions of culture to one logos of nature
for their criterion of one legally first and good. They introduced
Stoic philosophy in the religious teaching of children in the family
.as well as in the positive codification of Roman law which they car-
ried through. Thus while creating a new positive law they also
created the new living law necessary to sustain it.
But this Stoic philosophy, as they continuously emphasized, drew
not from the philosophy of diverse constitutions and cultures, of
which they were well aware, but from the philosophy of natural sci-
ence and of nature. They noted that while men live in differing cul-
tares with their differing pluralistic and competing legal norms they
nonetheless live in the same nature. Consequently they saw that by
supplementing the philosophy of cultural social science with the
philosophy of natural science, as the criterion of living law ethics in
13 David Nasmith, Ouiline of Roman History from Romulus to Jutinia, "The
Institutes of Gaius," Butterworths, London, 1890, p. 200.
HeinOnline  -- 19 Brook. L. Rev.  9 1952-1953
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the family and the positive law statutes and institutions in the state,
they could create the new positive law of the jus gentium and the
living law foundations necessary to sustain it. This is the point of
their doctrine, that jus gentium, the philosophy of culture or the
humanities for all men, is grounded in jus naturae, the philosophy
of nature.
It appears, therefore, that the need for a legal world order in an
atomic age can be met providing we take very seriously Ehrlich's
dictum that any positive law to be effective must be sustained by the
living law and proceed to create not merely new positive statutes and
institutions for a legal world order but also to lay bare and recon-
struct the new living law necessary to sustain them. The laying bare
of the living law of the world can be achieved by cultural anthro-
pology and sociology coming to articulation in the philosophy of the
world's cultures. The reconstruction of the living law can be obtained
by the natural sciences coming to articulation in the philosophy of
nature.
Both of these ways are, however, for the future. They will take
time. The present fact is that of a world of many nations governed
by different and even conflicting living law ideals and deeds. The
immediately effective world law must correspond to this present
situation. In other words, it must base itself on living law pluralism.
This is practicable immediately providing two things are done. First,
the right of any people to build their.living and positive law in terms
of their own traditional values and any others they choose must be
guaranteed. Second, in return for this guarantee each nation must
assume its share of the responsibility for outlawing and policing any
violation of this right. Under law there are no rights without corre-
sponding duties.14
F. S. C. Northrop
NEw HAVEN, CONNECTICUT.
14 For a further development of this point, see the author's "Contemporary Juris.
prudence and International Law," 61 Yale Law Journal 623 (1952).
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